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This study provides a general analysis of the United States (U.S.) Navy's
lease versus buy decision model in the satellite communications systems. It
also examines the Leased Satellite (LEASAT) and the Ultra High Frequency
(UHF) Follow-on satellites. It gives general background information on lease
versus buy decisions in both the public and private sectors. It evaluates the
inputs affecting the lease/purchase decision, particularly the tax inducement
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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, satellite communication is certainly one of the most influential
factors affecting the world's business relationships, human relationships, and
military effectiveness over other countries by making the distances closer
between them. Thus, it can be said that satellite communication is a new
horizon of changing concepts and fast growth.
Today, there are approximately 150 satellites in geosynchronous orbit, and
this number is expected to grow to 300 by the 21st century [Ref. 1: p. 88]. The
future of communications satellites has worldwide importance. Speculative
assessments about future markets for communications satellites are varied
and contradictory. Some people expect a decrease in the demand for
telecommunication satellites, mainly because of developments in fiber optics
technology. Others believe that there is in reality, gradually increasing
demand for satellites. According to one forecast, the worldwide market for the
information industry will be approximately $1.6 trillion by 1994 [Ref. 1: p. 92].
About half of this value will be in telecommunications. In spite of this forecast
there exists no specific worldwide demand forecast for telecommunication
satellite markets. Satellite transmission, compared to other transmission
modes, is cheaper in areas of hard climate, sparse population, rough territory,
and long transmission conditions. Since satellite technology is not easily
affected by the transmission distance, this allows a low cost for long distance
communication services. [Ref. 1]
A. OBJECTIVES
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the present lease versus buy
decision model for satellite communications systems in the United States. It
will examine how recent changes in the U.S. tax laws have affected the
decision model. The impact of these changes will be examined in the content
of the lease versus buy decisions in the Leased Satellite (LEASAT) program
and the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Follow-on communications satellites.
The main objectives of this study are as follows:
• Describe the lease and buy decision.
• Explain public and private sector leasing.
• Understand the advantages and disadvantages of leasing and buying in
both private and government sectors.
• Identify the economic forces affecting the government and private sectors.
• Determine the effect of the 1986 changes in the tax regulations on the
lease/buy decision.
• Describe the LEASAT program.
• Investigate the model used in the Navy's initial lease decision.
• Identify the factors leading the Navy to purchase the UHF Follow-on
satellites.
B. ORGANIZATION
This thesis is arranged into chapters, each having specific objectives.
Chapter II, Background to the Lease versus Buy decision: provides the
basic background information to give the reader a quick insight into this study.
Specifically, it gives the general definition of lease and buy decisions. It also
includes lease versus buy decision phenomena in both public and private
sectors.
Chapter III, Factors Considered in a Lease versus Buy Analysis: presents
the general arguments for and against leasing and buying. This chapter deals
with three basic areas which the decision makers take into consideration in
making an effective and best decision: technical performance, managerial
aspects and financial conditions. Finally, it discusses the tax laws affecting the
U.S. satellite communication sectors.
Chapter IV, Analysis of LEASAT: introduces the LEASAT Satellite
Communications Systems and the UHF Follow-on system. It presents the
LEASAT contract between the Navy and Hughes Aircraft Company,
emphasizing the Navy's position in this contract. This chapter also describes
the Navy's lease versus buy model. Finally, it discusses the lease versus buy
decision in the LEASAT and UHF Follow-on satellite program.
Chapter V, Conclusions: presents the conclusions and findings of this
study.
II. BACKGROUND TO THE LEASE VERSUS BUY DECISION
A. DEFINITIONS
Several definitions will be provided before discussing the lease versus buy
decision.
1. What is a buy?
By definition, "to buy" means getting something by paying its price
by money or its equivalent: to purchase [Ref. 2]. At first thought, buying
something may be considered so simple that everyone can do it as long as
they can afford the price. However, the buying process for a complex item like
a satellite communication system is not an easy procedure. To buy, in other
words, being the owner of an asset, can take different perspectives in different
media and in different occasions. Despite these different perspectives, the
unique common result in a buying process is that the purchaser becomes the
owner of the asset after making the appropriate payment.
Generally, the federal government's purchasing procedures introduce
many complexities beyond just obtaining ownership of an asset. For example,
buying a Military Satellite Communications System (MILSATCOM) in the U.S.
obligates the military service to describe the system requirements first, and
then explain its needs in meeting the Department of Defense (DOD) mission.
Next the system must be included in the DOD budget. The last step is
explaining the requirements for the system. These must be presented to
Congress, an agency outside DOD. [Ref. 2: p. 13] This kind of acquisition
procedure may vary from country to country.
2. What is a lease?
A lease is simply a contract for equipment or service between the
lessee (the leasing party) and the lessor {the owning party). In other words:
A lease is a form of contract that defines conditions of ownership and use for a
specific asset. In the standard text book definition, leasing is an agreement that
conveys to the lessee the right to use a specific property for a particular period
of time in return for a stipulated (usually periodic) cash payment. These
payments are made to the lessor, who holds the title or ownership rights to the
leased property. [Ref. 3: p. 5]
As indicated above, the " title holder" of an asset owns the claim to
the residual value of the asset at the termination of the lease. The residual
claimant has the right to both profits and losses. As a consequence of this,
the title holder of an asset enjoys any gains or suffers any losses resulting
from increases or decreases in value, respectively. [Ref. 3: p. 5]
Figure 1 on page 6 shows a simple lease flow diagram [Ref. 2: p. 16].
This figure was drawn like a flow chart to emphasize the relationships of the
participants involved in a lease process.
3. Types of leases
Leases may be observed in many different forms. For the purposes of
this study, leases will be grouped into three categories: true, or tax-oriented
leases, finance leases and leveraged leases. Each will be discussed briefly.
In the true or tax-oriented lease, the lessee typically produces or
acquires the property, but conveys all his rights to the property to another
individual or firm, including the tax benefits gained by owning the property.
The new owner of the asset becomes the lessor and gives back some of the tax
benefits by charging the lessee lower lease payments. The lessor is also
responsible for all operations and maintenance costs associated with the
asset. A true or tax-oriented lease can be simply defined as a "sell and lease
back" agreement. This kind of lease agreement typically gives the lessee the
opportunity to purchase the asset back at the end of the lease period. [Ref. 4:
p. 30]
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Courts issued a few guidelines
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Figure 1. Diagram of a Simple lease.
Generally, a sale-leaseback is considered valid when:
• There is a valid business purpose to the transaction. However, the IRS goes
even further in requiring that the transaction have a valid business purpose
beyond any tax considerations, although some courts have declined to support
that IRS requirement.
• The agreement, purchase options and terms should have resulted from an
"arm's length" transaction between the parties. It should be set up as if the
sale-leaseback had been arranged between outside and independent business
parties.
• The characterization of the agreement should reflect economic reality.
• The seller should not retain substantially the same control over the property
that he had before the sale.
• The agreement should be in writing and provide for a reasonable rent.
• A disqualifying equity in the property after the sale or lease could jeopardize
the agreement. [Ref. 4: p. 30]
A finance lease is a lease which gives the lessee complete
responsibility for an asset for most of its useful life. In other words, the lessee
is responsible for managing the asset and for operations and maintenance
costs, taxes and insurance. The lessor collects the lessee payment as a return
on its initial investment. [Ref. 3: p. 7]
A finance lease has some important differences compared to a
tax-oriented lease. In a finance lease, the lessee retains the rights and
responsibilities of ownership, including recurring costs and system
management. In addition, the lessee retains the tax benefits, so they are
directly captured rather than indirectly realized through reduced lease
payments. Finally, the finance lease may include a fixed purchase price at the
end of the lease period for as little as 10 percent of the original cost of the
asset [Ref. 4: p. 29]. The lessor is interested in the return on investment of the
asset instead of the management of the asset.
The U.S. Government does this, in terms of MILSATCOM, by leasing
the satellites in their geostationary orbit and then controlling the satellites. In
this case, the lessor provides the launch, launching services and Tracking.
Telemetry and Control services, but the government manages the system once
in orbit. The cost of these services is determined in the lease process [Ref.
2: p. 17].
The third type of lease is the leveraged lease. Compared to
tax-oriented and finance leases, the leveraged lease can be considered more
complex due to the participation of a third party. Simply, the leveraged lease
is a lease in which the lessor can pay as little as 20 percent of the buying price
and borrows the remainder of the price from a third party lender [Ref. 4: p. 29].
The lessor in this case is able to enjoy the full ownership tax benefits of the
property, even though the third party loans money to the lessor to buy it.
From an accountant's perspective, funding for a leveraged lease can be
divided into two parts: debt and equity. The lessor is the equity holder and
remains the real owner of the property at the end of the lease term. The lessor
also holds the tax benefits during the lease period. The third party is the debt
holder and provides the debt financing for the asset. Third parties are
typically banks or insurance companies. The debt holder receives most of the
lease payments to cover interest and reduction of principal. The equity
holder's return on investment is the residual lease payment remaining after
servicing the debt. Figure 2 on page 9 [Ref. 2: p. 18] shows a leveraged lease
flow diagram including the participants such as lessor, lessee, and the lender
and the interactions among them.
4. Lease versus buy: Advantages and disadvantages
Leases have some practical advantages to many companies, especially
small and start-up companies. In leasing, cash flow requirements can be
easily predicted due to fixed monthly payments. Leases typically require no
down payment and collateral, so that it reduces the up-front cash
requirements. Another advantage of leasing is that it is more flexible than
borrowing. Leases are considered operating expenses rather than capital
expenses. Operating expenses are typically easier to authorize than capital
expenses. This flexibility is attractive, even for the large companies. As Mr.




















Figure 2. Diagram of a Simple Leveraged Lease.
companies and in government, the capital appropriations process is so
complex that any change, especially in the middle of a year, is very difficult.
Leasing is a way to get around that." [Ref. 5: p. 190]
The ability to shift tax benefits is another potential advantage that
received a great deal of attention prior to 1986. Sometimes, small or start-up
firms can not take advantage of the tax benefits, including accelerated
depreciation and investment tax credit, associated with capital ownership.
This creates an opportunity for a company that can utilize the tax benefits to
purchase the asset and lease it to the interested firm. If the lessor passes on
a portion of the tax benefits, the lease payments can be lower than the interest
and amortization payments the lessee would face with ownership. The shift in
the tax benefits can be to the advantage of both parties. [Ref. 6]
Leasing also has some disadvantages. Sometimes reduced lease
payments might not be as valuable as the lost tax benefits, as often happens
when a firm has a large tax liability. Another disadvantage is that the lessee
loses ownership of the system. As a result the lessee sacrifices management
control over system operation. Finally, lease agreements typically require that
system operational specifications be specified well in advance of system
operation. This reduces technical flexibility in responding to changes in
demand or other conditions during the lease period.
B. PRIVATE SECTOR LEASING
Private sector leasing is not new. Although equipment leasing in the
private sector started after World War II, its recent boom dates back to 1963.
A 1963 decision by the Comptroller of the Currency allowed banks to lease
personal property. Thus, banks gave leasing respectability and business
increased and diversified from banks. New equipment having a value of $11
billion was leased in 1972, which accounted for almost 14 percent of all
business investment in capital equipment. Statistics show that the volume of
leases increased approximately 20 percent in that year. In the U.S., capital
equipment worth more than $60 billion was leased to corporations, institutions
and governments in 1973. [Ref. 5: p. 136]. This value reached $150 billion in
1985 [Ref. 2: p. 20].
The Investment Tax Credit (ITC), which entered the U.S. tax code in 1962,
encouraged firms without a tax liability to lease equipment. The ITC reduces
a firm's tax liability by 10 percent of the value of capital investments made
during the year. If a firm does not have a sufficient tax liability (as with small
or start-up firms) the tax benefit is carried over to future years, reducing the
value of the benefit. Thus, if a firm can not directly capture this benefit, there
is an incentive to enter a tax-oriented lease and captured indirectly. In private
sector leasing, the lessors originally assumed that Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) would permit only 95 percent of the equipment included in the lease to
qualify for the ITC. But according to IRS, all of the equipment qualifies.
Considering the shift in tax benefits, a company can often obtain an item
under the tax oriented lease for a lease rate which is three or four percent
lower than its long-term borrowing rate. Every tax-oriented lease must receive
IRS approval before it becomes active. According to Vanderwichen, "A lease
gets IRS approval if it provides that the equipment will have at least two years
of its life expectancy remaining at the end of the lease; if the lessor assumes
for financial-reporting purposes that it will have a residual value of at least 15
percent of its cost; and if the owner-lessor puts up at least 20 percent of the
cost in equity funds [Ref. 5: p. 192]." The point of IRS approval is to clearly
define the ownership of the property, making sure that the owner receives the
tax benefits from the lease agreement.
Many companies can take advantage of tax-oriented leases. As mentioned
earlier, tax-oriented leases are particularly attractive to firms showing losses
on tax returns. However, profitable firms such as oil and mining companies
can also make use of leasing if depletion allowances hold their effective tax
rates below those of the lessors [Ref. 5: p. 192]. Several industrial
corporations such as U.S. Steel, Eltra, Chrysler Financial, General Electric
Credit, and PepsiCo are heavily involved in leasing. To a large extent, the
profitability of private sector leasing depends on the tax rates of both parties.
[Ref. 5: p. 194]
C. PUBLIC SECTOR LEASING
Leasing and buying in the public sector are treated the same as in the
private sector. However, there is one basic difference; the government does
not pay taxes. Thus, reduced lease payments due to a shift in tax benefits do
not actually save the government money. They simply shift the burden of the
acquisition from the government agency leasing the asset to the general
treasury. Tax benefits reduce corporate profits tax payments to the general
treasury.
Several policy considerations, which are not applicable in private sector
leasing, can also affect decisions in public sector leasing. For example,
government policy encourages dependence on the private sector whenever
possible. Leasing relies more heavily on private sector resources and
management, reducing the use of public sector personnel and facilities. Risk
taking considerations are different from private sector leasing, too. For
example, in a military satellite communication (MILSATCOM) system, national
security considerations frequently require that the system embody technology
that advances the state of the art. Because of inherent technical uncertainties,
which are not typically present in private sector systems, specialized contract
arrangements are required that differ from the lease contracts used for private
sector communication services. If the leased system is to be shared by public
and private sector users, national security considerations make sharing the
system difficult. A MILSATCOM system must have mobility (in order to
communicate with small transportable, remote ground terminals), security (in
order to be protected against anti-jam and encryption), and physical
survivability (for protection against nuclear and laser weapons attacks). These
requirements are unnecessary for private sector users. [Ref. 3: p. 8]
In past years, although a large number and variety of leases have been
tried in the public sector, only a small number of them were successfully
employed. Almost all of the successful leases have involved shared systems.
As a necessary result of this, the government evolved to the use of service
leasing rather than equipment leasing. Shared leases are appropriate when,
as in the case of telecommunications, government demand does not require
leasing the entire system capacity. If the systems were not shared, the
government would have unused capacity. For example, The U.S. government
has not yet leased an entire satellite communications system.
MILSATCOM is an example of a shared system. The Department of
Defense (DOD), Air Force Satellite Communication Facility (AFSCF), and
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) are currently leasing
communications services from common carriers such as RCA, AT&T
(COMSTAR), Western Union (WESTAR), and INTELSAT. Some of the terminals
are for government use and some are shared with other users.
Two other military satellite communications systems, GAPFILLER and
LEASAT. are leased to provide UHF satellite communications services to
mobile platforms. Comsat General Corporation first bought the GAPFILLER
satellites from Hughes Aircraft and then leased them to the U.S. Navy. In
LEASAT, satellites were bought by a group of lessors from Hughes Aircraft.
The satellites were then leased to Hughes Communications Service and
finally, in turn, Hughes Communication Service leased the communications
service to the U.S. Navy. The LEASAT leasing agreement is detailed in
Chapter IV.
As mentioned above, one important factor in a shared system is whether
or not the hardware or service can be shared among the military and civilian
users. For example, can agreement be reached on location and control of the
satellite to satisfy all parties? In such a leasing contract, priorities have to be
set up to guarantee that the primary government functions are met by the
system. [Ref. 7: p. 5]
III. FACTORS CONSIDERED IN A LEASE VERSUS BUY ANALYSIS
There are several important factors which should be taken into
consideration in a lease versus buy decision. These are technical aspects
related to technical requirements and management aspects related to cost
and decision-making responsibilities associated with managerial control. The
technical and the management areas are interrelated, making it difficult to
separate one from the other. Finally, there are financial aspects related to
both funding and cost factors, including the tax implications taken into
consideration in lease versus buy decisions.
A. TECHNICAL ASPECTS
Technical aspects in lease versus buy decisions for both the private sector
and government sector are an important matter which require precise work
and good planning. Capital assets have life spans that extend over several
years. This is reflected in the duration of most leasing contracts and is even
more evident when the asset is purchased. That's why both government and
private sectors have to know their objectives and their requirements. This is
complicated because technology and the requirements change overtime.
The technical considerations in a lease versus buy analysis for a satellite
communications system involve the technical requirements and the risks
related to them. For the lease situation, satellite communication system
requirements are stated in terms of serwce and performance. According to
the lease strategy, the design is "frozen" at the time of contract award in
order to have the program run smoothly [Ref. 2: p. 27]. Because of the
inflexible specifications, the system contractor may get some important
savings in optimizing design and construction. This may occur without
affecting the government contract because performance rather than design is
considered in the satellite specifications. However, this places most of the risk
of technical uncertainty on the lessor, rather than the government. This
makes leasing less appropriate when technical uncertainties are significant.
In the buy alternative, requirements are stated in terms of design
specifications rather than performance specifications. There are two aspects
to flexibility, construction flexibilities from the contractor's point of view and
management flexibilities from the buyer's point of view. Design specifications
are generally more flexible from the buyer's perspective. The contractor has
to design the system to meet whatever requirements are set by the buyer.
With a lease, performance specifications are typically set early in the design
process. This gives the contractor construction flexibility in designing the
system to meet the performance specifications, but it limits the buyer's
management flexibility in changing those specifications. On the other hand, in
the buy option, design specifications limit the contractor's construction
flexibility. However, design specifications have flexibility so that they may be
changed to accommodate changing requirements as the technology changes.
This causes a series of re-approval phases. As a result, high costs and
delayed programs are more prevalent when the government buys a system
than when the system is leased. Furthermore, the government bears the risk
of technical uncertainty in a purchased system. [Ref. 2: p. 28]
The technical evaluation in lease versus buy decisions must balance the
relative strengths and weaknesses of the purchase and the lease alternatives.
Leases provide the contractor with more flexibility in designing the system but
reduce the lessee's flexibility because the design is frozen. However design
specifications generally result in a more smoothly running program with fewer
delays. In the buy alternative, technical requirements are more flexible but
this can result in more delays and higher costs. The appropriate balance will
depend on the uncertainty of future requirements and technical improvements,
and on the level of technical uncertainty. [Ref. 2: p. 28]
The technical aspects of the lease/buy decisions are listed in Table 1 on
page 16. [Ref. 7: p. E2]
B. MANAGERIAL ASPECTS OF THE LEASE VERSUS BUY EVALUATION
Managerial aspects are also important and can not be separated from
financial and technical aspects. Managerial aspects during system planning
and construction are affected by the lease versus buy decision, because a
lease is based on performance specifications rather than design
specifications. A lease requires less administrative and management effort
because it doesn't require review in the Planning, Programming and
Budgeting System (PPBS). Thus, management overhead for the government
will be lower, both in the administrative and planning phases of the program.
The manufacturer and lessor are responsible for management to meet the
performance requirements once they are determined and agreed on in a
contract. This lessening of management overhead corresponds to the
inflexibility of the design. [Ref. 2: p. 29]
Table 1. COMPARISON OF LEASE/BUY (TECHNICAL)
Lease Buy
Performance specifications written
in terms of service.
Specifications written in terms of
equipment design or performance
characteristics.
Contractor may be able to optimize
design to provide service without
detailed justifications/reviews with
government.
Design may be changed, by
contractor, but may involve many
layers of review and approval.
Fixed price specifications are frozen
at time of contract award making for
a smoother running program with
less chance for delay. However,
freezing design prohibits
government from changing the
system to meet changes in
requirements.
Design may be changed to meet
changes in requirements at extra
time and cost. Program delays may
require management attention.
Other management considerations are observed in contract negotiations
which characterize both leasing contracts and purchase contracts. These
management considerations concern: the type of contract (fixed price, cost
plus fixed fee, or some combination of the two); the payment plan; and the
period of the lease contract. Another important management issue is to define
satisfactory and unsatisfactory performance of the system. [Ref. 2: p. 30]
Managerial aspects are simply treated as the trade-off between managerial
control and the costs related to such control. In a lease option, governments
have lower management costs since the number of personnel assigned is
small and the administrative costs related to top management levels are low.
In return, however, the government sacrifices management control. In the
case of purchase, managerial and administrative costs are higher than in lease
option, but the government has greater management control. The proper
balance depends on the trade-off between managerial costs and the
importance of managerial control. [Ref. 2: p. 30]
The management aspects of the lease/buy decisions are listed in Table 2.
[Ref. 7: p. E4]
Table 2. COMPARISON OF LEASE/BUY (MANAGERIAL)
Lease Buy
Possible reduction in management
effort by government personnel.
Usually higher involvement by
government management personnel
because of added acquisition
responsibilities.
government has little management
control over the system
development.
government has full management
control over the system
development.
C. FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE LEASE VERSUS BUY EVALUATION
The financial aspects of the lease versus buy evaluation are more
complicated. There are basically three factors included in the financial
category, cash flow factors, financial risks, and tax inducements. To properly
integrate these factors, Federal agencies should make a detailed economic
analysis before making their lease versus buy decision for a specific good or
service [Ref. 8: p. 5].
1. Cash Flow Factors
In the lease option, costs will be spread over the lifetime of the lease.
Operations and maintenance funds are used to make the lease payments,
which take place concurrently with the in-orbit service period. Leasing has
lower up-front costs but higher annual operating cost, because development,
procurement, launch, and testing are amortized in the lease payments rather
than incurred up-front. [Ref. 2: p. 31]
However, in the buy option, procurement moneys must be approved
and budgeted into the yearly budget process. In this option large upfront
expenditures are required during the Research and Development (R&D),
procurement, launch, and testing phases. Since owning a telecommunications
system is a big investment, this requires careful managerial oversight and a
detailed budgeting process. [Ref. 2: p. 32]
2. Financial Risks
There are financial risks as well as technical risks. Technical risks are
a matter of the design and the production process of the system. Financial risk
represents potential dollars required to develop and purchase a particular
system. "The higher the technical risk, the greater the financial risk [Ref. 2:
p. 32]." Thus, these two risks can not be separated from one another.
There are several aspects involved in supporting commercial satellites
in their geostationary orbits. Planners should consider these issues and their
financial risks, including pricing policies, transportation system choice,
insurance, satellite confirmation, technology, transponder configuration,
reliability, sparing and life span of the satellites. The manner in which these
aspects are specified in the lease contract will determine whether the lessee
or lessor assumes the associated financial risks. Assessing the financial
impacts associated with alternative options will help determine the best
alternative. Incremental annual profit, cash flow, return on investment and
risk, which are evaluated in terms of variability of performance criteria, are the
financial criteria used to rank alternative specifications. [Ref. 9: p. 32] In order
to evaluate the financial impacts of these alternative decisions on
communications satellite business enterprises, a general financial planning
model has been developed. This model considers a variety of factors ranging
from the number of spare transponders to the transportation system [Ref. 9:
p. 34].
The lease and the purchase alternatives generally face a two step cost
comparison process. In the first step, all cost categories related to each
alternative during its economic life must be identified. The second step is the
process of estimating the quantity of each cost category and the timing for
each category under each alternative. After these two steps are determined
for the lease and buy options over their functional lives, the annual costs
should be changed into their present values to incorporate the time value of
money. After this process, buy and lease alternatives are compared to
determine the alternative with the lowest present-value costs. [Ref. 8: p. 5]
The time value of the money in any lease versus buy analysis is one
of the major factors and should be considered carefully [Ref. 8: p. 7]. A main
difference between the lease and the buy alternatives of satellite
communications system lies in the timing of the expenditures. Large
expenditures are required in the early years to capitalize the development and
the manufacturing process for a buy option. After the system becomes
operational, the expenditures typically decrease to a relatively steady level.
In the lease option though, the lessee has lower expenditures in the early
years, but higher annual expenditures are required after the system becomes
operational. As an example, the 1975 estimates of NASA show the differences
in timing of Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) expenditures in
both buy and lease alternatives in Figure 3 on page 20. 1 [Ref. 8: p. 15]
1 Data are from NASA's January 1975 lease-versus-purchase analysis which includes
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Figure 3. Timing of Government Expenditures for TDRSS Service Via a
Purchase or a Lease Method
3. Tax Inducement
What is one of the main factors behind attracting commercial entities
into the leasing world? The simple three letter word tax gives an important
answer to this question. Tax implications make leasing a satellite
communications system to the government particularly attractive to
commercial enterprises. The leveraged lease is designed to shift tax benefits
in order to provide the lessor a sufficient rate of return while providing the
government with lease costs below the normal financing costs [Ref. 2: p. 33].
Prior to the tax law changes in 1986, owning a satellite communications
system brought tax benefits including depreciation, or Accelerated Cost
Recovery (ACR), and the Investment Tax Credit (ITC). Depreciation spreads
the cost of the asset over its useful life time, when the asset is used to
generate income over several years. Property is considered depreciable if it
is used for business or expected to generate income. The depreciation period
is a matter of wear and tear, exhaustion, or obsolescence. The total
depreciation deduction is generally limited to the cost of property minus the
estimated salvage value. Since useful life of a satellite communications
systems is usually considered 8 years, the annual depreciation deduction is
simply the total allowable deduction spread over this eight-year period.
The Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) took effect in 1981.
ACRS eliminated salvage value in calculating total depreciation basis and
accelerated the depreciation process by reducing the system life used for tax
purposes, shifting the bulk of the annual depreciation allowance to earlier
years of the system life. ACRS is very complex but provides an increased
investment motivation for capital and economic enlargement. [Ref. 10: p. 25]
The second benefit of owning a satellite communications system was
the ITC. ITC reduced the amount of taxes required of a business purchasing
capital assets. The lessor could claim 10 percent of new capital investment as
a credit against income tax liabilities in the current year. The ITC was a tax
credit as opposed to a deduction from taxable income. [Ref. 10: p. 25]
Because a government agency does not pay taxes, government
agencies did not capture the tax-related benefits of owning a capital asset.
This created the opportunity to use a tax-oriented lease to pass the tax benefits
to a private sector business in return for reduced lease payments. Thus, tax
benefits appeared to reduce lease costs relative to purchase costs.
Phillips, however, contends that leases may actually be more
expensive than purchases, ignoring the tax implications.
In general, a long term leasing program that provides for leasing an asset
for its useful life will be more expensive than purchasing the asset because a
third party -the lessor- is involved; whereas, in a procurement arrangement,
only the purchaser and the manufacturer are involved. Thus, it would be
expected that the third party will require a return on his investment and this will
be passed on to the lessee as an added expense. If the lessor's required rate
of return exceeds the Government's discount rate, the yield on Government
securities, leasing will be more expensive than purchasing. The reason is that
a lessor would expect to earn a higher rate of return on his investment than he
could earn by investing in Government securities and his added expense is
passed on to the lessee. [Ref. 2: p. 37]
Thus, a lease will appear less expensive than purchasing the system if
the reduced government management costs and shared tax benefits exceed
the added profit required by the lessor. Thus, It is obvious that the financial
attractiveness of the lease and the purchase options are considerably affected
by the tax rate and timing of Federal corporate tax payments. [Ref. 8: p. 15]
However, Phillips [Ref. 2] and Block [Ref. 6] point out this comparison is
flawed. The shift in tax benefits do not actually save the government money.
It simply shifts the burden from the leasing agency to the general treasury.
Thus, from an overall government view point, tax benefits should be ignored
in lease versus buy analysis.
In brief, leasing satellite communications systems to government
agencies appears attractive because leases allow the agency to spread the
cost of the system over several periods. The agencies can also use
operational and maintenance funds instead of procurement funds.
Government agencies put more managerial effort into purchases than into
leases. Finally, leasing appears to cost less to the leasing agency because
some of the cost is shifted from agency's budget to the general treasury as
reduced tax revenue. [Ref. 2: p. 38]
The financial aspects of the lease/buy decisions are listed in Table 3
on page 24. [Ref. 7: p. E3]
D. CURRENT TAX REGULATIONS AFFECTING U.S. SATELLITE
COMMUNICATIONS
Prior to 1984, depreciation or ACR and ITC were the tax benefits
associated with ownership of the property. However, these benefits began to
decrease after the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 1984 and were virtually
eliminated in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. These regulations affected the U.S.
satellite communications sector within the U.S. as well as abroad.
The 1984 tax bill eliminated the ITC and ACRS benefits if the capital asset
was used by a tax-exempt entity. A tax exempt entity was defined to include
schools, churches and charitable organizations, as well as foreign persons or
organizations (entities that did not pay U.S taxes). Under DRA, if a satellite
owner leased the satellite or some of its transponders to any non-tax paying
entity, it lost the accelerated depreciation and investment tax credit on the
portion of property leased to the non-tax paying entity. The fear of losing the
tax benefits forced satellite owners to consider leaving their satellites idle
rather than losing these benefits. [Ref. 10: p. 24]
The 1986 tax reform eliminated the 10 percent ITC for all business
investment and reduced the depreciation allowance [Ref. 11: p. 25]. The ITC
turned out to be the biggest loss to the telecommunications industry.
Table 3. COMPARISON OF LEASE/BUY (FINANCIAL)
Lease Buy
Generally uniform cash flow of O&M
funds over lifetime of system.
Major outlay of procurement funds
early in program and over relatively
short term.
Lessor may be able to buy satellites
at a lower cost than government due
to less review and fewer unique
specifications and tests.
Government procurement costs




Total cost is generally higher due to
insurance, cost of capital, and return
on investment to lessor.
Government has no insurance
program nor return on investment
considerations. There is no actual
cost of capital but is imputed in cost
analysis.
Investment tax credits and deferred
taxes tend to lower effective interest
rate on loans.
There are no investment tax credits
for bought system. Deferred taxes
are not an issue.
Total payment is in the form of
in-orbit performance incentives.
Thus, the lessor is gambling 100%
of his income on product
performance.
Government typically dedicates
10-15% to in-orbit performance
incentives. Thus, the vendor is
gambling only 10-15% of his income
on product performance.
Capital financing may not be
possible without government
guarantees.
Capital financing is not required.
Termination liability would typically
be structured to guarantee the
lessor some reasonable return for
his efforts and loss of potential
profit.
Termination liability limited to
sunken development and
production costs.
Lessor assumes financial risk for
successful performance. However,
degree may be limited or minimized
through negotiation or financing
arrangements that shift more risk to
the lessee.
Government assumes financial risk
for successful performance.
Congress included some exceptions for assets being procured on January
1, 1986, the date the ITC expired. It gave companies an opportunity to use the
credit even on property put in service after December 31, 1985, as long as the
property was contracted for on that date. According to this tax reform,
five-year property and seven-to 20-year property could qualify for ITC as long
as they were put in service before January 1, 1987 and 1989 respectively. [Ref.
11: p. 24]
Thus, lease versus buy decisions made after 1986 should reflect the new
tax laws. One interesting question concerns the expected impact that these
changes in tax laws will have on government lease versus buy decisions.
Presumably, leasing will appear to be a less attractive option. Of course, the
change in tax laws will not affect the actual cost of government leases, only the
portion of the lease cost shifted from the leasing agency to the general
treasury. Government agencies will now be forced to consider the actual cost
and benefits of the leasing option, not ihe perceived tax benefits.
IV. ANALYSES OF LEASAT AND UHF FOLLOW-ON
A. WHAT IS LEASAT?
The origin of satellite communications dates back more than 30 years. It
started with a scientific article written by a British Scientist named Arthur C.
CLARKE [Ref. 12: P. 6]. The Navy established the first operational satellite
communications system in 1959, using the moon. [Ref. 12: p. 7]
The Navy's first leased communications system was called GAPFILLER,
which received service from the Maritime Satellite system (MARISAT). Three
MARISAT satellites were procured and managed by the Commercial Satellites
(COMSAT) General Corporation. These satellites were launched in 1976 and
placed over the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian oceans. The Navy leased the Ultra
High Frequency (UHF) transponder on each of the three MARISAT satellites in
order to establish an independent Navy communications capability. The
Navy's leased portions of MARISAT was named GAPFILLER in order to
differentiate between MARISAT and Navy management and control. It was
leased to fill the gap during the transition from the first generation satellite
system to the follow-on Fleet Satellite communications (FLTSATCOM) system.
FLTSATCOM was the first operational communications system designed
for Navy's use only. It is an information exchange system that uses the
satellites as communications relays. FLTSATCOM originally consisted of ten
satellites but was later reduced to five. The first one was launched in 1978.
Compared to GAPFILLER, by design, it was heavier and larger.
The estimated cost of the FLTSATCOM was $509 million, or an average of
$100 million per satellite. The Navy purchased these satellites which were
very expensive compared to the most modern commercial communications
satellites. Commercial systems at the time cost $40.2 million per satellite,
including launch costs. According to these costs estimates, the FLTSATCOM
system cost 249 percent more than the commercial communications satellites.
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As a result of this difference, alternatives to purchasing a Navy system were
explored. In the FY 1978 Appropriations Act, Congress directed the Navy to
lease communications satellite service instead of purchasing the satellites for
the fleet use. Following this mandate, the U.S. Navy contracted to lease its
third operational system, Leased Satellite (LEASAT), which is a follow on to
MARISAT or GAPFILLER. [Ref. 13: p. 624]
Thus, in 1977 Congress directed that a leasing program be utilized as an
alternative to purchasing the complete FLTSATCOM system. The Secretary of
Defense designated the Navy as the executive service for this project and
assigned the Navy to prepare a request for proposal to be released in calender
year 1978. After going over different industry proposals, Hughes
Communications Services, a division of Hughes Aircraft Company, was
selected as the prime contractor for LEASAT. [Ref. 12: p. 35]
The LEASAT system provides worldwide satellite communications services
to land mobile, airborne, shipborne, and fixed stations of the U.S. Navy,
Marine Corps, Army, and the Air Force as well as the joint chiefs and unified
commanders with a five-year service period. The Navy is the largest user of
LEASAT.
B. GENERAL LEASE/BUY METHODOLOGY
The General Accounting Office (GAO) described a four step general
lease/purchase decision model when it addressed the overall methodology
used by the NASA in making its lease/buy comparison for the Tracking and
Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) [Ref. 8: p. 5-6]. Basically, the first step
deals with the cost categories related to each alternative during the system's
economic life. The number of cost categories in this comparison can be broad
depending upon the complexity of the system.
The second step deals with estimating the magnitude of each cost category
and the time in which the cost will be incurred under each alternative. To
provide accurate estimates of the net cost implications of each of the two
alternatives, and their corresponding cash flows, it is important to estimate
both the magnitude and timing of these costs. In both the purchase and lease
alternative, costs where the amount and timing are the same are not important
to consider since there is no economic difference between them.
The third step emphasizes the time value of money. Once the costs for the
buy and the lease options have been determined over the useful life of the
system being considered, then the annual cost must be converted into their
present values considering the time value money.
Finally, the fourth step is a comparison of both alternatives. In this case,
the present value of both buy and lease costs will be compared and whichever
has the lower present value of costs is considered the more economically
attractive.
Figure 4 on page 29 [Ref. 2: p. 41] shows the information suggested by
GAO for lease/buy comparisons.
C. THE NAVY'S MILSATCOM LEASE/BUY MODEL
The Navy has used a similar model to evaluate its purchase versus lease
decision for satellite communications systems. This model was written for an
IBM compatible Personal Computer (PC) with Lotus 1-2-3 software. Dr.
Patricia M. Dinneen prepared a model program to evaluate MILSATCOM lease
versus purchase choices quantitatively, while working for RAND Corporation.
[Ref. 2: p. 40]
This model has the following objective:
Provide a general, flexible parametric model to assist government and
corporate decision makers in determining when to lease rather than buy. The
model can be used by the Government to determine conditions under which
leasing is less costly than buying and by the private firm to determine when
leasing is more profitable than selling. [Ref. 2: p. 41]
Figure 5 on page 30 [Ref. 2: p. 42] shows the Navy's decision model.
COST CATEGORIES INCLUDED IN THE MODEL:
• Design phase contracts costs
• Launch vehicles costs
• Ground station facilities costs
• Ground station equipment costs
• Ground station operation and maintenance costs
• Lease payments costs
• Supplemental network hardware costs
• Supplemental network operation and maintenance costs
• Project support costs
• Personnel staffing costs
SSSSSSSSSSS TOTAL COSTS
OTHER INPUTS TO THE MODEL:
• Estimated recovery of Federal income tax
• Various Government discount rates
• Net undiscounted cost to the Government
Figure 4. The General GAO Lease Versus Buy Model
COST CATEGORIES INCLUDED IN THE MODEL:
• Research, development, test and evaluation costs
• Spacecraft cost
• Launch vehicle cost
• Ground equipment costs = cost of ground station control facilities
• Seller's/Lessor's other costs:
Insurance
General administration expenses
Tracking, Telemetry and control (TT&C) costs
• Seller's profit rate and price in the case of a buy
$$$$$$$$$$$$ TOTAL COSTS
OTHER INPUTS OF THE MODEL:
• Corporate tax rate
• Government tax rate
• In the case of a buy:
- Seller's discount rate
Annual profile of costs and payments
• In the case of a lease:




Annual profile of costs and payments
• Period over which lessor pays back loan
Figure 5. The Navy's Lease/buy Model
The specific lease and purchase outputs of the Navy's model are as
follows:
Lease outputs of Navy's model;
• Lease payment/target - the amount of annual lease payments, calculated on
the basis of lessor's costs, discount rate and the number of lease years.
• Annual loan payment -- the amount of annual loan payments, calculated on the
basis of the lessor's costs, interest rate and number of loan years.
• Lease payments - the schedule and amount of annual lease payments.
• Lessor's costs -- the schedule and amount of annual administrative costs.
• Lessor's loan payments -- the schedule and amount of annual loan payments
spread over the designated number of loan years. [Ref. 2: p. 44]
Purchase outputs of Navy's model;
• Sellers progress payments -- the schedule and amount of annual progress
payments.
• Seller's costs -- the schedule and amount of annual costs.
• Seller's taxes -- the schedule and amount of annual taxes.
• Seller's cash flow -- the schedule and amount of annual cash flows.
• Seller's PDV $ -- the schedule and amount of annual, present discounted value
of seller's cash flow, using the seller's discount rate.
• Government cash flow -- the schedule and amount of annual cash flow.
• Government's PDV S -- the schedule and amount of annual present discounted
value of Government's cash flow, using the Government's discount rate.
• Agency's PDV $ -- the schedule and amount of annual present discounted
value of the Agency's cash flow. This amount will differ from the
Government's PDV $ because the seller's taxes are excluded.
• Seller's IRR -- the Internal Rate of Return, defined as that discount rate such
that the present value of the seller's cash flow is zero. [Ref. 2: p. 43]
Comparing these two models implies that there is more flexibility in
defining the information used in the Navy's model than in GAO's model. This
flexibility enables the Navy's model to account more accurately for the
decision variables. However, the cost inputs in both models are similar. Due
to the differences in the information used, the outputs of the two models will
vary.
Furthermore, both models incorporate the tax benefits captured by the
lessor in estimating expected lease payments. In GAO model, NASA deducted
the estimated corporate income taxes from the estimated lease/purchase
costs. These estimated Federal income taxes were made up of two elements.
The first one was the income taxes paid by contractors, and the second one
was income taxes resulting from interest paid by contractors to lending
corporations. In addition to these tax deductions, NASA also wrote off the
income taxes that would be paid by the prime contractor and subcontractors
from its estimated cost of purchase [Ref. 8: p. 15]. In the Navy's model,
government and corporate tax rates were important to the Navy's lease/buy
analysis. In addition to these tax considerations, ITC was considered as
another important factor in the event of a lease.
D. LEASAT CONTRACT WITH HUGHES
The leasing of this satellite system was conceptually different from the
Navy's leasing of Gapfiller Satellite (GAPSAT). In the GAPSAT case, the Navy
leased the communications services from the communication Satellite
Corporation (COMSAT) which in turn bought the satellites from the
subcontractor, Hughes Aircraft Company. In the LEASAT case, the Navy
leased the equipment from Hughes Communication service. The LEASAT
Satellites will be purchased from Hughes Aircraft by a group of lessors. The
lessors will lease the satellites to Hughes Communications Service, who will,
in turn, lease the communication service to the U.S. Navy. This is a leveraged
leasing arrangement that enabled the Navy to share the tax advantages.
The noticeable points in this contract are as follows:
No increase in price for the originally contracted services ($335 million for five
years of service from four orbital positions).
• A firm fixed price option to extend satellite service for two additional years
with an additional option to buy the satellite at the end of this seven-year lease
period.
• Navy flexibility in dates of service commencement.
• A revised payment schedule that would provide Hughes with some payments
in advance of the commencement of services, subject to the availability of
appropriations for this purpose. [Ref. 14: p. 7-8]
With this contract, another important issue, involved the Navy's
requirements when the lease period expired. The contract included a five-year
lease plus a two-year option for each satellite and a purchase option after the
seven-year service period. According to Rear Admiral Richard C. MACKE,
Naval Space Commander, "Purchase of the satellites will be an issue in the
next few years as it involves a substantial amount of money [Ref. 15: p. 12]."
Thus, the Navy obtained the option to expand in-orbit service from five to six
or seven years. The Navy also obtained a purchase option for each satellite
after seven years of service. [Ref. 14: p. 12]
According to section three in the LEASAT contract between the Navy and
Hughes Communication Services Inc., (see appendix C) the Navy agreed to
pay $67 million at the time communication services started. Later payments








If the Navy had decided to exercise the lease and purchase options,
Hughes would have received $20 million for each additional year of service
and $15 million for each satellite purchased. If the Navy had purchased the
satellites, Hughes would have provided tracking, telemetry and control
services throughout the remaining life of the satellites. The Navy would have
paid $5.4 million per year for these services, [ref. 14: p. 12-13] Other details
of this contract are included in Appendix C. The actual contract outcomes are
now discussed.
1. Navy's Position in LEASAT
As stated before, this program was originally mandated by Congress.
The intent was to acquire additional capacity at a lower cost than projected for
FLTSATCOM program, considering the comparative cost estimates of
FLTSATCOM and commercial satellites. As a trade-off for lower costs, the
LEASAT satellites were less capable than the FLTSATCOM satellites,
particularly in survivability (nuclear hardening). The implication was that the
leased system provided essential communications capacity and meet
minimum technical standards (Appendix B shows the service differences
between FLTSATCOM and LEASAT) at a much lower cost.
DOD selected the Navy as its executive agent in the LEASAT program,
in part because the Navy had the greatest share of capacity among all users.
Given this responsibility, the Navy approached the lease contract carefully,
drawing heavily on NASA experience in leasing the TDRSS system. According
to the Navy, cost effectiveness and leasing enough capacity to meet its needs
were the most important factors in their leasing decision. [Ref. 13]
The lease has proven to be an economical and efficient means for
providing UHF satellite communications connectivity [Ref. 14: p. 3]. Navy
officials are pleased with the result of leasing the LEASAT satellites, but they
do not expect that they will be able to repeat the LEASAT arrangement. As
Macke said,
That leased contract was a good deal, it was smart. We will never get another
one like it. Hughes took a bath. The insurance companies took a bath. We got
a good deal. There is still extensive yearly negotiations on how much we are
going to pay for it. You will never see it again because nobody is going to sign
up to the kind of deal Hughes signed up to. [Ref. 15: p. 51]
There are several reasons for Navy to lease a communications system.
First, the Navy can obtain services for a fixed-price. This minimizes the risk
of cost overruns. Second, the Navy can establish services while avoiding a
major initial capital investment. Third, leases minimize the financial risk of
launch or in-orbit satellite failures. Finally, the Navy benefits from the
engineering and operating experience of the private sector in developing
reliable and economic satellite communications services using proven
technologies. [Ref. 16: p. 134]
In the case of Navy's LEASAT program, these reasons indicated a
lease would be beneficial for the Navy. As stated before, the Navy benefited
from the fixed-price policy, avoided an initial large capital investment, and had
no responsibility for the financial risk of launch and satellites failures in their
orbits. The Navy also benefited from economical and technological standpoint
by leasing these satellites.
E. UHF FOLLOW-ON
The Naval Space Command has determined that one of its highest
priorities is to acquire a new generation of UHF communications satellites to
replace the FLTSATCOM and LEASAT communications satellites in the 1990s.
These current communications systems are being forced to last almost twice
their seven-year design lives. The Navy Space Command has put a high
priority on a UHF follow-on system in order to prevent any discontinuity in its
global communications activity. The UHF Follow-on satellites will be designed
to have a minimum 10 year service life with an average 14 year life
expectancy. The first satellite of this program is scheduled for launch in 1992
[Ref. 15: p. 46]. For this project, General Electric, TRW, and Hughes Aircraft
competed for the UHF Follow-on (UFO) contract. The Hughes Aircraft
Corporation won this competition. The contract will be managed by the Space
and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR). Estimated costs for the
Navy exceed S1 billion.
Initially, Hughes will design one satellite, the newest line of its spacecraft
series. After this satellite becomes operational, it will provide communication
services to ships at sea and other fixed and mobile stations widely scattered
around the world. [Ref. 17: p. 1]
Hughes will take the old Navy systems into consideration making the new
system operationally compatible with the older terminals still in use. The new
system will also employ the same frequency spectrum as the current system,
with a larger number of transmitters providing more communications capacity.
[Ref. 17: p. 1]
1. Considerations Compared to LEASAT
In the UHF Follow-on program, it appears that technical requirements
played a more important role than they had in the LEASAT program. Thus, the
Navy had to look at the factors in the lease/buy decision differently than in its
earlier decision. In particular, flexibility and technical uncertainty became
much more critical factors. Because purchasing becomes more attractive as
flexibility and technical uncertainty increase, this factor favored a purchase
rather than lease decision for the UHF follow-on satellites.
Another important issue was the tax law changes in 1986. As stated
earlier, DOD lost its perceived tax benefits on leasing an asset as a result of
these tax regulations. For a system expected to cost the Navy in excess of $1
billion plus launch costs, these tax benefits could be substantial. Thus, both
technical needs of the Navy and the change in tax laws favored a purchase
rather than lease decision for UHF follow-on satellites.
2. Framework for Lease versus Buy Cost Analysis
There are several issues that need to be resolved before conducting a
lease versus buy cost analysis for the UHF Follow-on program. These issues
include system lifetime, insurance costs, financing and launch costs. It is
important to ensure that each of these factors is treated equivalently in both
the lease and purchase options or the analysis might be biased.
• Issues
Lifetime
Satellite lifetime introduces a complication into the lease versus buy
cost analysis. As stated earlier, the UHF Follow-on satellites are designed for
a ten year service life and a maximum 14 year design life. This four year
difference brings up an important issue. In a lease, an asset must have at least
20 percent of its design life remaining at the end of the lease period for a
contractor to qualify for special lease tax treatment. Thus, 10 years were
considered the maximum lease period. In the purchase case, the Navy
receives an extra four years of communications service. In the lease/purchase
cost analysis, both options must have comparable lifetimes. There are two
possible corrections. First, a ten year life can be used for both options. To
make the systems comparable, in this case, it is necessary to estimate the
residual value of the satellites after 10 years and deduct this salvage value
from the cost of the purchased system. The second correction would be to
compute the lease cost as if the lease period was 14 years. Both corrections
were considered in the UHF Follow-on program. [Ref. 18]
Insurance costs
Insurance costs have become an important consideration in light of
recent launch experience. In the lease case (or in a purchase if the system is
purchased in orbit), it is the responsibility of the contractor to insure both the
launch and on orbit operations. These insurance costs are incorporated into
the lease payments. In a purchase, insurance is the responsibility of the
Government. To keep the purchase and lease options comparable, it is
important to include the same insurance cost in both cases, regardless of
whether the government actually purchases insurance. This was done in the
UHF Follow-on program, where insurance costs were based on insurance
industry forecasts and NASA data [Ref. 18: P. 3].
Financing
Financing arrangements can also influence the outcomes of the
purchase/lease cost analysis. In the lease option, there are both debt and
equity portions if the lease is structured according to the leveraged lease
concept. As has been explained in Chapter II, the lessor, Hughes, is the equity
holder and remains the real owner of the property at the end of the lease
period. The debt holder, as the third party in this leasing process, provides
the debt financing for the asset. In this case, one option for the debt holder is
the Federal Financing Bank (FFB) which offers subsidized rates for
government guaranteed leases. Special financial arrangements, including
leveraged leases and FFB financing make leases more attractive relative to
purchases. To eliminate this distortion, innovative leasing strategies,
including leveraged leases and FFB financing, were not considered. In
addition to this, accelerated depreciation and ITC were not taken into
consideration, due to both the uncertainty of their future tax status and realism
of introducing them into the contractor's proposed tariff schedule. [Ref. 18: p.
1]
Launch costs
Launch costs are another important consideration because they
represent approximately 50 percent of the hardware cost of the satellite. In the
purchase option, it is assumed that the government purchases the launch
services. In the lease option, the lessor provides launch services. If the
government and private users are charged different rates for launch services
{i.e. if government agencies receive subsidized rates from NASA), it could
distort the purchase/lease cost analysis. To eliminate this distortion, the same
launch costs were used in both options.
3. Lease Versus Buy Cost Analysis
Table 4 on page 39 shows the key parameters taken into consideration
by Navy [Ref. 19] and Booz, Allen and Hamilton Inc. [Ref. 18] in their lease
versus buy analyses.
Table 4. KEY PARAMETERS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Parameters Navy Assumptions Booz, Allen &
Hamilton Inc.
Number of Satellites 10 10
Satellite Unit Cost $100 million $91 million
Launch Cost/Satellite $45 million $45 million
Insurance (launch) 20% 20%
Insurance (on-orbit) 4%/year 4%/year
Annual Operation Cost $11 million $11 million
ROE on Exposed Funds 4% (buy) / 4% (lease) 15% (buy) / 4% (lease)
Fee to the Third Party 10% Fee on 4% Real
Interest
10%
Discount Rate 3.32% (real) 7.175%
Operational Period 10 Years 10 Years
Satellite Design Life 14 Years 14 Years
Table 5 on page 40 shows the cost differences between the lease and
purchase alternatives. In this table, Case I and III are based on Booz, Allen
and Hamilton Inc. assumptions. Case I includes a 10 year lifetime, where
Case III considers a 14 year system life. The Navy case is based on the Navy's
assumptions.
Insurance A reflects a 20 percent premium for launch and initial
coverage plus four percent per-year on orbit insurance costs for the declining
value of the satellite. Insurance B reflects a 13 percent premium for initial
coverage of satellites, with the government self insuring the launch in the case
of the purchase option. Insurance B also includes the four percent per-year
on orbit insurance for the declining value of the satellite.
Table 5. LEASE VERSUS BUY COST COMPARISON
CASES
UNDISCOUNTED DISCOUNTED
Purchase Lease Purchase Lease
1 (Baseline) 1.598.9 2,034.1 1,101.0 971.0
1 (With Residual Value) 1,438.0 2,034.1 1.054.1 971.0
1 (With Insurance A) 2,031.1 2,568.7 1,353.6 1,226.2
1 (With Insurance A &
Residual Value) 1,870.1 2,568.7 1,306.7 1,226.2
1 (With Insurance B) 1,877.4 2,372.0 1,258.6 1,132.3
1 (With Insurance B &
Residual Value) 1,716.4 2,372.0 1,211.6 1,132.3
III (w/o Insurance) 1.653.9 2,235.2 1,055.6 880.1
III (w/lnsurance A) 2.086.1 2,765.0 1.260.5 1,088.7
Navy (w/lnsurance A) N/A N/A 1,700.0 1,775.0
Using undiscounted values. Booz, Allen and Hamilton Inc. found the
purchase option to be more expensive than the lease option in all cases.
However, when values were discounted, the ranking reversed and the lease
option became least expensive in all cases. Contrary to this, the Navy found
the purchase option to be four percent less expensive than the lease option,
using discounted values.
The critical factors affecting this decision are the discount rate and the
interest rate charged on exposed funds (funds spent by the contractor but not
reimbursed by the government). The discount rate is one critical assumption.
The higher the discount rate, the more important the up-front cost differences
while out-year cost differences become less important. Figure 6 on page 42
and Figure 7 on page 43 [Ref. 18: p. III-5-6] compare the undiscounted and
discounted government cash flow for purchase and lease options. Because a
lease reduces up-front expenditures and increases out-year expenditures, the
higher the discount rate, the more attractive are leases. This is apparent
from Table 5. On an undiscounted basis, the purchase option is less
expensive than the lease. With 3.32 percent discount rate (in the Navy case)
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lease and purchase costs are essentially equal. With a 7.175 percent discount
rate, as in Cases I and III, a lease is less expensive than a purchase. Thus, the
results of the purchase/lease cost analysis are very sensitive to the discount
rate.
The interest changed on exposed funds is another critical parameter.
For the purchase option, the contractor receives progress payments during the
procurement process. Therefore, the contractor never has a significant
amount of exposed funds. For a lease, the lessor does not receive lease
payments until the government begins to receive service. Thus, the lessor
incurs all procurement and launch costs before receiving payments from the
government, exposing a significant amount of funds. Booz, Allen and
Hamilton Inc. found that exposed funds reached a peak of $847 million in one
of the lease option cases (Case I with Insurance A) [Ref. 18: p. 11-17]. The
higher the interest demanded by the lessor for these exposed costs, the less
attractive a lease appears. Both the Navy and Booz, Allen and Hamilton Inc.
assumed a four percent real interest rate on exposed funds for the lease
option.
Finally, the tax law changes in 1986 eliminated the 10 percent ITC and
accelerated depreciation. Without these tax benefits, the cost analysis favored
a purchase by a four percent. The tax benefits could potentially have reduced
the lease cost by the four percent margin.
4. Conclusions
Examining the UHF follow-on satellite program and its cost analyses,
yields the following conclusions.
• Costs
In the discounted cost case, using Booz, Allen and Hamilton Inc.'s
assumptions, a lease appears to be the least expensive option. Using the
Navy's assumptions, a purchase is less expensive but the cost differential is
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insignificant (four percent). In the Navy's analysis neither option emerges as
a clear choice on the basis of costs.
• Sensitivity
The analysis is sensitive to the assumptions made in the
lease/purchase cost analysis. In particular, the discount rate turned out to be
a very critical factor considering the cash flow profile. Interest on exposed
funds is also critical. Other significant factors include system life, residual
value, insurance costs, and launch costs. Given the comparability of costs in
the Navy case, elimination of the tax benefits could have influenced the
outcomes of the analysis.
• Other factors
The Navy decided to purchase rather than lease the UHF follow-on
satellites due in part to the four percent cost difference. However, there are





The level of technical sophistication favors a purchase over a lease
because it gives the government more flexibility to modify system
specifications and shifts the risk of technical uncertainty to the government.
Leases balance the government's cash flow requirements over the system's
life. This is advantage for leases, especially where the budget constraints are
tight. Finally, a lease reduces the government's management requirements.
The lease/purchase decision must balance costs with these other factors.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The most important point in either purchasing or leasing a satellite
communications systems, from the military, or more specifically the Navy's,
point of view, is to get a continuous communication service, with adequate
capacity and capability. In this study two basic methods were covered: one is
the direct purchasing method where DOD appropriates enough funds to buy
the system; the second is leasing the service or equipment.
In deciding whether to lease or purchase a system, several factors should
be considered. One important factor is whether the service or hardware can
be shared with other civilian and military users. The Navy will get some cost
savings from a lease if the satellite can be a shared system.
The following issues should also be taken into consideration in making the
lease or purchase decision:
• Technical factors
Whether the system uses proven or new, unused technologies.
Importance of technical flexibility
Importance of schedule/budget constraints
• Managerial factors







Prior to 1986, the U.S. tax code included tax incentives for U.S. industry,
including the investment tax credit and accelerated depreciation, to encourage
investment and enable companies to compete more effectively in the world
market. These tax incentives were available to the satellite industry. These
tax incentives created an apparent savings when the Navy leased a satellite
system from the private sector. This encouraged leases as opposed to
purchases. These tax incentives were eliminated in 1986.
In the LEASAT Program several factors favored leasing as the preferred
acquisition. Cost and schedule constraints were very important. Technical
capability and flexibility were less important enabling the system to use
proven technology and performance specifications. Risks were moderate,
enabling them to be shifted from the government to the private sector. [Ref.
3: p. 12] Finally, tax laws at the time made leasing appear less expensive than
it actually was.
Considering these factors, leasing was selected in the LEASAT program
as the best alternative. Analysis of this decision indicates that factors other
than lowest cost are important in lease/buy decisions.
Conditions are different in the UHF follow-on satellite program. Technical
capability has received increased priority. This favors state-of-the-art
technology and technical specifications. Cost and schedule, while still
important constraints, appear to have a lower priority relative to technical
capability. Finally, the tax laws have eliminated the perceived savings
previously attributed to leases. Considering these factors, the Navy decided
to purchase the UHF follow-on system. If the tax laws had not changed, it is
likely that leasing would have been comparable to or cheaper than
purchasing. However, it is impossible to determine if cost considerations
would have led the Navy to change their decision.
APPENDIX A. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ACR Accelerated Cost Recovery
ACRS Accelerated Cost Recovery System
AFSATCOM Air Force Satellite Communications
AFSCF Air Force Satellite Communication Facilities
AT&T American Telephone and Telegraph
COMSAT The Communication Satellite Corporation
CSA Communications Service Authorization
DOD Department of Defense
EHF Extremely High Frequency
FFB Federal Financing Bank
FLTBCST Fleet Broadcast
FLTSATCOM Fleet Satellite Communications
FY Fiscal Year
GAO General Accounting Office
GAPSAT Gapfiller Satellite
IBM International Business Machine
IRS Internal Revenue Service
IRR Internal Rate of Return
ITC Invesment Tax Credit
INTELSAT International Telecommunications Satellite Organization




MILSAT Military Satellite Communications
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
PC Personal Computer
PDV Present Discounted Value
PPBS Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
PTT Postal, Telegraph and Telephone
R&D Research and Development
ROE Return On Equity
SHF Super High Frequency
SPAWAR Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
TDRSS Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System
UFO Ultra High Frequency Follow-on
UHF Ultra High Frequncy
U.S. United States
USAF United States Air Force
WESTAR Western Union Satellite
APPENDIX B. SERVICE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LEASAT AND FLTSAT
Each FLTSATCOM satellite is hardened to JCS criteria and has a total of
23 channels operating at UHF frequencies, plus a single SHF uplink channel for
Navy Fleet Broadcast (FLTBCST). Specifically, the UHF channels are: one 25
KHz channel for FLTBCST downlink, nine general purpose relay channels
serving both secure voice and teletype/data user networks, one DOD
wideband (500 KHz) channel, plus seven 5 KHz channels for USAF forces, and
five 5 KHz channels for general USAF use. The latter 12 5 KHz channels are
included within the AFSATCOM program and. together with the 500 KHz
wideband channel, are managed by the USAF, while the remainder are
managed by the Navy.
On the other hand, the LEASAT satellites have a total of 13 channels. As
in the FLTSATCOM satellite, there is provided a single SHF uplink, a UHF
downlink channel for FLTBCST, plus a total of six 25 KHz channels, four for
Navy use and two for Army Ground Mobile Forces. In addition, LEASAT
contains a DOD wideband (500 KHz) channel plus five 5 KHz channels for
USAF AFSATCOM use.
APPENDIX C. LEASAT CONTRACT N00039-79-0011:
1. Hughes has from the outset depended from a technical and financial
standpoint upon the availability of launch services by Space Shuttle. The Navy
has known this.
2. Hughes has informed the Navy that, because of Shuttle program delays,
Hughes is unable to perform according to the contract schedule and its
planned financing is unavailable. Hughes has represented that its investment
to date under the LEASAT Contract is approximately $116 million, that
development is essentially complete, substantially all parts and materials are
on hand, and assembly and tests have progressed satisfactorily. Hughes has
informed the Navy that it has been forced virtually to suspend production and
to place the LEASAT program in a caretaker status due to the Shuttle delays
and their impact upon the prospects now virtually non-existent, of obtaining
leverage financing to obviate the high interest rates attributable to the
aforesaid investment.
3. After conclusion of whatever Space Shuttle test flights are necessary to
reveal a reliable schedule for Shuttle launches, Hughes and the Navy will
agree upon revised dates for commencement of communication services.
These dates shall be as early as practicable, taking into account the time
reasonably required for Hughes to complete satellite production and to
coordinate with the Shuttle launch schedules.
4. In the event the agreement specified in section three can not be reached on
or before November 1, 1981, the rights and remedies of Hughes and the Navy
will be determined on the basis of the LEASAT contract, as though this Aide
Memoire had never been agreed to and executed, and written notice of this
event shall be given by the Navy to Hughes.
5. Hughes will be obliged to provide communication services beginning at any
time designated by the Navy within the first three years following the agreed
upon dates for commencement of communication services, it being
understood, however, that the Navy shall make its designation of its
anticipated timeframe at the earliest practicable date in order to permit
Hughes to formulate its construction schedule in conformity with such
designation. Moreover, the Navy shall give Hughes 120-day notice of the
precise date for commencement of communication services by Hughes.
Hughes shall be entitled to no additional payment if the Navy designates dates
for commencement of communication services after dates agreed to pursuant
to section three, provided, however, that the Navy will bear any launch costs
in excess of costs that would have been incurred for launches at the agreed
upon commencement dates.
6. The Navy shall have the option upon one year's notice to increase in-orbit
services from five to six or seven years, at unit prices per year and per
satellite of $20 million. The Navy also will be provided the option to purchase
any of one to four satellites after seven years of in-orbit service at $15 million
per satellite.
7. Hughes will receive an initial payment of $67 million at the time revised
dates for commencement of communication services are agreed to under









The payments in fiscal year 1983 and fiscal year 1984 shall be made in full
during the first quarters of those fiscal years. In the event Hughes is able to
obtain the leverage financing referred to in section two, or in the event Hughes
can delay for a period in excess of 90 days the construction schedule it has
planned to meet launch dates in December 1983, June 1984, December 1984,
and June 1985, the parties shall reexamine the above funding profile, this for
the purpose of ensuring that the relationship between the funding profile and
the costs incurred by Hughes is kept in equitable balance. In addition to the
payments set out above, if the Navy exercises all or any part of its option rights
provided for in section 6, Hughes shall be entitled to $20 million during each
additional year of service by each satellite, and $15 million upon the purchase,
if any, of each satellite. If the Navy purchases one or more satellites, Hughes
shall provide tracking, telemetry and control services throughout the
remaining life of the satellite or satellites, for which the Navy will pay $5.4
million during each year such services are provided.
8. The Navy shall continue payments on the schedule set out in section seven
unless and until the Navy concludes that it will not receive communication
services to which it is entitled. In such an event the Navy shall have the right
to discontinue its payments, and to recoup all payments unearned by Hughes
under the contract and Hughes shall have an absolute obligation to repay
those payments. However, if the reason for Hughes's failure to provide such
communication services is the inability, by reason of delay or cancellation of
the Space Shuttle program, to meet the dates for commencement or
continuation of services agreed to pursuant to sections three and five, Hughes
shall have such rights to recover its incurred costs as may be determined on
the basis of the LEASAT contract, as though this Aide Memoire had never
been agreed to and executed.
9. Hughes shall provide security and full audit rights satisfactory to the Navy.
10. The Navy and Hughes will promptly proceed to negotiate contract
modifications and such other documents as are necessary to implement this
Aide Memoire. Any payments by the Navy pursuant to such modifications and
implementing documents shall be subject to the availability of appropriations
for this purpose.
HUGHES AIRCRAFT CORP. & HUGHES
COMMUNICATION SERVICES, INC.,
BY ALLEN E. PUCKETT,
Chairman of the board and Chief Executive Officer.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
BY EDWARD HIDALGO,
Secretary of the Navy.
Dated: January 5. 1981.
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